Anderson argued, alongside other postcolonial theorists, that colonial infrastructure was never neutral. The roads built to extract cotton from India structured Indian economic geography for centuries after independence. The railways that moved British troops continued to move Indian goods along routes designed for imperial convenience. The administrative languages, the legal codes, the educational systems — all inherited their shape from the purposes of extraction rather than from the needs of the populations that came to depend on them. The AI infrastructure inherits this non-neutrality. Models trained on predominantly English data, optimized for Western workflows, hosted on servers controlled by American corporations — this is not a neutral substrate for global building. It is a specific configuration with specific distributional consequences.
The colonial infrastructure critique has been developed by scholars including Edward Said, Achille Mbembe, Partha Chatterjee, and Walter Mignolo. Its core claim is that the material and institutional legacies of colonialism persist long after formal decolonization because the infrastructure itself — roads, laws, schools, linguistic standards — was built to serve imperial rather than local purposes. A post-independence state inherits this infrastructure and must operate within its constraints even if its political project has changed.
The AI transition arrives at a moment when these postcolonial critiques are fully developed, and the framework maps onto the new situation with troubling precision. Consider the training corpus of a frontier language model. It is predominantly English. It is drawn from internet text dominated by American sources. It reflects the curatorial decisions of engineers at a small number of firms in a small number of cities. When the Lagos developer uses this model, she is not operating on a neutral substrate; she is operating on an infrastructure configured by decisions taken elsewhere for purposes that did not include her.
This is not a claim that the model is useless to her. It is plainly useful, as The Orange Pill's democratization thesis correctly insists. It is rather a claim that the usefulness is shaped by the infrastructure's configuration in ways that impose distributional costs on peripheral users — costs that do not appear in the metrics of adoption or productivity but that matter for the long-term question of who the AI-builder community becomes.
True democratization, on Anderson's framework, requires not just access to the products of the infrastructure but participation in its governance. The colonial subject had access to British roads; the subject did not have governance over where roads were built or for what purpose. The parallel for AI is exact: the Lagos developer has access to the tool; she does not participate in the decisions that determine which languages the tool supports, which use cases it is optimized for, or which jurisdictions it prices out of the market.
The Mbembe volume in this cycle develops the specifically colonial dimensions of this analysis. The Anderson volume's contribution is to frame the question in terms of imagined community: whose community is being imagined by the infrastructure, and whose community is excluded by it?
Anderson's own engagement with colonial infrastructure was most sustained in The Spectre of Comparisons (1998) and in his Indonesian and Philippine studies. The application to AI infrastructure is an extension of the framework by contemporary scholars including Mbembe, Ethan Zuckerman, and Sabelo Mhlambi.
Infrastructure is never neutral. Every system for moving people, goods, or information embeds assumptions about whose movement counts.
Persistence after formal independence. The infrastructure outlasts the explicit political project that produced it.
Distributional consequence. Peripheral users bear costs that do not appear in metrics centered on the infrastructure's designers.
Access versus governance. Using the infrastructure is not the same as participating in decisions about it.
AI parallel. Training corpus composition, model optimization targets, and platform pricing reproduce the colonial pattern.
The debate over whether open-source AI mitigates or reproduces the colonial infrastructure pattern is unresolved. Proponents argue that open weights allow sovereign fine-tuning; skeptics note that the base capabilities remain Western-configured and that fine-tuning cannot undo training-corpus bias.