The function of primary goods in Rawls's theory is to make interpersonal comparisons possible without requiring agreement on controversial questions about the good life. Under the difference principle, the least advantaged are those with the smallest share of primary goods — a specification that does not require resolving whether their life plans are the best plans or whether they would be happier with different aspirations. The framework is deliberately neutral among comprehensive conceptions of the good, while still providing a determinate metric for evaluating distributions.
The primacy of the social bases of self-respect is particularly important for the AI transition. Self-respect, in Rawls's framework, is the most important primary good — the good without which all other goods lose their value. The social bases of self-respect are the institutional conditions that support a person's sense that her life plan is worth pursuing and that she possesses the capabilities to pursue it. These conditions include meaningful work, social recognition, and the sense that one's skills and contributions are valued by others. The AI transition threatens the social bases of self-respect for a significant portion of the population — not necessarily by making them unemployed but by eroding the social recognition of their expertise, their craft, their accumulated mastery.
Amartya Sen argued that primary goods were the wrong metric — that what matters is not what resources people have but what they are able to do with those resources, their capabilities. Two people with identical bundles of primary goods can face radically different prospects depending on their conversion capacities. A disabled person and an able-bodied person with the same income do not have the same opportunities. The Sen critique has reshaped development economics and influenced the design of human development metrics, but it has not displaced primary goods from Rawlsian theory; many philosophers treat the two approaches as complementary rather than competing, using primary goods as the metric at the level of institutional design and capabilities as the metric at the level of individual evaluation.
Rawls introduced primary goods in A Theory of Justice (§§15, 60–67) and refined the specification in his 1982 essay "Social Unity and Primary Goods" in response to Sen's and other critics' arguments. The list of primary goods evolved across his career, with the social bases of self-respect taking on increasing prominence as Rawls came to see it as the most important good and the one most directly threatened by institutional failures.
Goods every rational person wants. Primary goods are defined by their relationship to rational agency as such, not to any particular conception of the good life.
Currency of distributive justice. The difference principle evaluates distributions in terms of primary goods, enabling interpersonal comparisons without requiring agreement on controversial questions.
Priority of self-respect. The social bases of self-respect are the most important primary good because without them all other goods lose their value to their possessor.
Not fungible. Primary goods cannot be substituted freely for one another; a person cannot be compensated for the loss of liberty by additional income, or for the loss of self-respect by additional opportunities.
Metric challenge from capabilities approach. Sen and Nussbaum argued that what matters is what people can do, not what resources they have; the debate between primary goods and capabilities remains central to contemporary theories of justice.