This page lists every Orange Pill Wiki entry hyperlinked from John Searle — On AI. 19 entries total. Each is a deeper-dive on a person, concept, work, event, or technology that the book treats as a stepping stone for thinking through the AI revolution. Click any card to open the entry; in each entry, words colored in orange link to other Orange Pill Wiki entries, while orange-underlined words with the Wikipedia mark link to Wikipedia.
Byung-Chul Han's diagnosis — extended through Dissanayake's biological framework — of the cultural dominance of frictionless surfaces and the specific reason the smooth feels biologically wrong.
The principle — defended by Wiener at considerable personal cost — that the creators of powerful systems bear moral responsibility for what those systems do after deployment, and that the claim of value-neutral research is a fiction that tr…
The quality of subjective experience — being aware, being something it is like to be — and the single deepest unanswered question in both philosophy of mind and AI.
The research tradition — converging from neuroscience, philosophy, and robotics — that mind is not separable from body, and whose empirical maturity over four decades has made the computational theory of mind increasingly hard to defend.
The disorienting intimacy of having a non-human intelligence interpret one's half-formed thought with enough fidelity that the thought feels received rather than processed — the experiential signature of Campbell's goddess encounter in AI …
Not intention in the everyday sense, but the philosophical property by which mental states are directed toward or about objects and states of affairs in the world — the aboutness that, Searle insisted, formal computation does not possess.
Searle's sharpest distinction — a computer simulation of a hurricane does not produce rain, a simulation of digestion does not produce nutrients, and a simulation of understanding does not produce comprehension — the argument that formal mo…
Searle's foundational distinction between the formal structure of symbol manipulation (syntax) and the meaningful content those symbols carry for a comprehending mind (semantics) — a distinction the AI age has made simultaneously more conse…
The device that increases the magnitude of whatever passes through it without evaluating the content — Wiener's framework for understanding AI as a tool that carries human signal, or human noise, with equal power and no judgment.
Searle's term for the non-representational capacities, dispositions, skills, and pre-intentional assumptions that enable intentional states to function — the embodied know-how without which symbols cannot be interpreted, and the capacity th…
Searle's 1980 thought experiment — a person in a room manipulating Chinese symbols by rulebook without understanding a single character — the philosophical demonstration that syntactic processing does not constitute semantic comprehension…
The cognitive mechanism by which human observers attribute understanding, personality, and even feelings to systems that manifestly lack them — not through foolishness but through the automatic operation of perceptual systems that evolved w…
The most durable objection to the Chinese Room argument — that while the person in the room does not understand Chinese, the system as a whole does — and Searle's devastating response: memorize the rulebook, become the system, and find th…
The governance regime change in which the accumulated textual, visual, and computational output of millions of individuals was appropriated for AI training under terms their original contribution did not contemplate — the paradigmatic case …
Searle's 1980 paper in Behavioral and Brain Sciences — the single most consequential publication of his career and one of the most discussed articles in the history of philosophy of mind — that introduced the Chinese Room argument and ge…
Edo Segal's 2026 book on the Claude Code moment and the AI transition — the empirical ground and narrative framework on which the Festinger volume builds its diagnostic reading.
Serial entrepreneur and technologist whose The Orange Pill (2026) provides the phenomenological account — the confession over the Atlantic — that Pang's framework diagnoses and treats.
American philosopher of mind and language (1932–2025), Berkeley professor for six decades, whose 1980 Chinese Room argument generated more published responses than perhaps any article in the history of the Behavioral and Brain Sciences a…