This page lists every Orange Pill Wiki entry hyperlinked from Gilbert Ryle — On AI. 19 entries total. Each is a deeper-dive on a person, concept, work, event, or technology that the book treats as a stepping stone for thinking through the AI revolution. Click any card to open the entry; in each entry, words colored in orange link to other Orange Pill Wiki entries, while orange-underlined words with the Wikipedia mark link to Wikipedia.
The replacement framework for the ghost question — evaluating AI systems by the observable properties of their performance rather than by hidden metaphysical facts about their interiors.
Ryle's diagnostic for questions that misallocate concepts to the wrong logical type — treating a University as a thing alongside its colleges, or thinking as an event alongside processing.
The quality of subjective experience — being aware, being something it is like to be — and the single deepest unanswered question in both philosophy of mind and AI.
Ryle's central analytical method: treating mental concepts as descriptions of tendencies to behave in certain ways under certain conditions, rather than as names for hidden inner events.
The classical philosophical puzzle of how any reasoning system determines what is relevant — which Damasio's framework answers: in biological organisms, the body solves the frame problem through feeling.
Ryle's foundational distinction between practical competence exhibited in performance and propositional knowledge stated in sentences — a distinction the AI moment has made economically decisive.
The Oxford philosophical movement of which Ryle was a leading figure — the insistence that philosophical confusions arise from departures from, rather than inadequacies of, ordinary language.
The specific shape of a system's dispositional performance — where it is trustworthy, where it breaks down, and under what conditions the difference matters.
The characteristic philosophical method of showing that a persistent problem is a pseudo-problem generated by grammatical confusion — and thus that the response is not an answer but a clarification.
The research paradigm—dominant from the 1956 Dartmouth Workshop through the 1980s—that attempted to build intelligence by manipulating symbolic representations according to formal rules, and whose failures vindicated Dreyfus's critique.
The meta-disposition that governs the exercise of all other dispositions — the behavioral property of attending to what one is doing with the vigilance that distinguishes competent from excellent performance.
Descartes's 1641 split between res cogitans and res extensa — the pilot and the cockpit — that structured Western thought for four centuries and underwrote the foundational assumptions of artificial intelligence.
Ryle's target metaphor for the Cartesian picture of mind as a private stage on which mental events are performed for an audience of one — dismantled by the regress of observation it requires.
Ryle's name for the persistent fallacy that intelligent practice derives from prior theoretical knowledge — a legend refuted by the regress argument and now ruined in practice by the arrival of AI.
Ryle's decisive refutation of the intellectualist legend: if intelligent action required prior contemplation of a rule, the contemplation itself would require further rules, and intelligent action could never begin.
Ryle's diagnostic distinction between physical movements stripped of context and actions described with their purpose, significance, and dispositional background intact.
Geertz's foundational method: the richly contextual interpretation that distinguishes meaningful action from mere physical movement, revealing what behavior signifies within the webs of meaning that give it weight.