The threshold's behavior explains the puzzling finding from the Berkeley study that AI does not reduce work but intensifies it. The workers were not being exploited by external taskmasters. They were satisficing on a cost curve that had been radically reshaped. When producing the next deliverable costs almost nothing, the rational response is to generate another one — not because any authority demands it, but because the satisficing calculus, operating as it always has, registers that the cost of the next attempt is trivially low.
The mechanism is what connects Simon's 1956 theory to Byung-Chul Han's diagnosis of auto-exploitation. Where Han treats the behavior as a cultural pathology of internalized achievement pressure, Simon's framework reveals it as the predictable output of rational satisficing in an environment where generation cost has collapsed while evaluation cost has not. The two readings are not incompatible; Simon's provides the mechanism, Han's provides the cultural context that amplifies it.
The distinction matters because it implies different interventions. A cultural pathology is addressed through cultural change — different values, different metrics, a philosophical reorientation. A misaligned cost curve is addressed through architectural design: redesigning the environment so that the satisficing decision encounters resistance at the appropriate point. Not because friction is virtuous, but because the quality of the output depends on the quality of the evaluation, and evaluation degrades under the attentional exhaustion that unrestricted search produces.
Simon's 1956 formalization specified the threshold as a parameter that adjusts to environmental richness. In rich environments where acceptable alternatives are easy to find, the agent can afford to be more demanding because the expected cost of continued search is low relative to the expected improvement. In sparse environments where acceptable alternatives are hard to find, the agent becomes less demanding because the cost of continuing exceeds the expected value of improvement.
The AI age inverts the dynamic that produced the original formalization. Simon's 1956 environments had natural friction — the cost of generating the next alternative was substantial, which imposed a ceiling on how high the threshold could rationally rise. AI removes that friction, eliminating the ceiling and allowing the threshold to rise indefinitely. The rational response produces behavior that looks pathological from the outside and feels exhausting from the inside, because the bounded evaluative capacity that would determine whether the rising threshold has been met has not risen with it.
The threshold floats. It is a dynamic parameter that tracks the cost of continued search, not a fixed standard of quality.
Generation cost shapes the threshold. Lower generation cost produces higher thresholds; higher generation cost produces lower ones.
The AI age removes the ceiling. When generation cost approaches zero, nothing prevents the threshold from rising past the point where bounded evaluation can assess whether it has been met.
Rational behavior can produce exhaustion. The pattern of continuous generation and accumulating fatigue reflects not irrationality but rational satisficing in an environment the satisficing calculus was not designed for.
Architectural solutions exceed willpower solutions. Imposing structural resistance on the search process — evaluation checkpoints, protected reflection periods, mandatory peer review — outperforms individual discipline because willpower is itself a bounded resource.
Critics of the satisficing-threshold framing argue that it pathologizes what should be celebrated — the genuine expansion of what bounded minds can accomplish. The framework's defenders respond that diagnosis is not the same as dismissal. Acknowledging that AI expands capability while producing specific cognitive risks is compatible with embracing the expansion; it simply requires designing the expansion rather than surrendering to its default dynamics.