The Life of the Cosmos, published in 1997, is the book in which Smolin first developed at length the hypothesis of cosmological natural selection. The central argument is that the apparent fine-tuning of physical constants — the fact that the constants take values exquisitely compatible with the formation of stars, atoms, chemistry, and life — is not an accident requiring anthropic explanation, nor evidence of design, nor a selection effect of an undifferentiated multiverse. It is the product of a specific evolutionary process operating across generations of universes. Universes reproduce through black holes; offspring universes inherit constants that are slight variations of their parents' constants; universes whose constants favor black hole production come to dominate the population; and the constants that favor black hole production happen, as a predictable side effect, to favor complexity. The book provides the framework that Chapter 2 of the Smolin-AI volume uses to give the river of intelligence its cosmological grounding.
The book emerged from Smolin's frustration with the standard responses to the fine-tuning problem. Anthropic reasoning — the observation that the constants must be compatible with our existence because we could only observe a universe whose constants permit observers — is logically airtight and explanatorily empty. It tells us nothing about why the constants take the specific values they do. The multiverse response — the proposal that all possible universes exist somewhere, and ours is simply the corner where the constants work — is not an explanation but an abdication of explanation. It accepts that the constants are arbitrary and gives up on understanding them. Smolin's hypothesis is an attempt to explain fine-tuning without either punting to anthropics or retreating to a timeless multiverse.
The book's argument proceeds through several stages. It begins with the observation that the fine-tuning is real and requires explanation. It then develops the analogy to biological evolution: populations of universes, variation across generations, differential reproduction based on properties that themselves depend on the varying parameters. It then argues that the mechanism of reproduction is black hole formation, which connects cosmology to the structure of stellar evolution and the physics of the early universe. Finally, it draws out the implication that the same constants that maximize black hole production also maximize the production of complexity — so a universe selected for black holes is, as a predictable side effect, a universe selected for stars, chemistry, life, and consciousness.
The book is also notable for its philosophical commitments. Smolin argues that the hypothesis restores what the multiverse framework had abandoned: the possibility of explaining why the universe is the way it is. It also, crucially, requires the reality of time. If universes evolve across generations, then there is a meta-time — a larger temporal process within which cosmological selection operates. This commitment to the reality of time at cosmological scale would become, over the subsequent two decades, one of the central themes of Smolin's work.
For the AI discourse, the book's framework is consequential in ways that most technology commentary has not absorbed. If the arrow of complexity is a feature of a universe selected for complexity-production, then the emergence of AI is not a technological aberration but a cosmological phenomenon. It is an expression of the same selection pressure that produced everything else complex in the universe. The framework does not make any specific form of AI inevitable — contingency operates at the level of specifics — but it makes the general direction toward increasingly sophisticated information processing a feature of the physics rather than an accident of human history.
The book was published by Oxford University Press in 1997. It built on a 1992 paper ('Did the universe evolve?' Classical and Quantum Gravity 9) and was developed during Smolin's years at Penn State and Syracuse University before his move to the Perimeter Institute.
Fine-tuning is real. The physical constants take values that require explanation — they are not arbitrary or obviously free parameters.
Anthropic reasoning is inadequate. It describes a selection effect but does not explain why the constants take any particular values.
Universes reproduce. Black holes produce baby universes with slightly varied constants — a mechanism for cosmic evolution.
Selection operates on constants. Universes whose constants favor black hole production come to dominate the multiverse.
Complexity as side effect. The constants that maximize black hole production also produce stars, chemistry, life, and consciousness — the predictable correlation that grounds the arrow of complexity.