Institutional plasticity is the specific temporal condition that shapes the stakes of current AI governance decisions. Technological transitions follow a characteristic pattern: an initial period of experimentation during which governance architecture is still responsive to intervention, followed by consolidation during which that architecture hardens into structures resistant to modification. The first decades of industrialization were a period when alternative arrangements were imaginable — the factory system might have been organized differently, distribution of productivity gains might have been governed by different rules. But the arrangements that actually emerged hardened into structures that required generations of political struggle to partially reform. The AI transition is currently in its period of plasticity; the governance arrangements being established now will determine distributional outcomes for generations.
The concept provides the temporal frame for Fung's argument about the urgency of institutional innovation. The governance decisions being made in this narrow window will harden into structures that last decades or centuries; the framework knitters of Nottinghamshire had decades to organize before the arrangements consolidated, and even then the consolidated arrangements required extensive subsequent reform. The populations affected by AI disruption may not have decades — capabilities are advancing on timescales measured in months, and consolidation could occur faster than in previous transitions.
The period has specific characteristics that make intervention possible. Power arrangements are still contested rather than consolidated. Political entrepreneurship has unusual opportunities to shape outcomes. Demonstration effects can propagate before counter-mobilization organizes effectively. The accumulated experience of previous transitions has produced institutional designs available for adaptation and implementation.
The concept also identifies the specific mechanism through which the period closes. Consolidation occurs as institutional arrangements acquire stakeholders whose interests depend on maintaining them — as the specific forms of governance become embedded in legal systems, corporate structures, political coalitions. Once embedded, modification requires either the accumulation of sufficient counter-coalition (historically requiring decades) or crisis sufficient to disrupt existing arrangements (historically requiring substantial social damage).
Fung's framework implies a specific strategic injunction: use the period of plasticity to build institutional capacity that will persist beyond consolidation. The participatory mechanisms proposed in the framework are designed to be robust against consolidation pressure — standing bodies with institutional authority that acquire their own stakeholders and constituencies, preserving participatory governance as consolidation proceeds.
The concept draws on historical institutionalism in political science, particularly the work of Paul Pierson on path dependence and Kathleen Thelen on institutional change. The application to AI governance represents an extension of this tradition to a contemporary technology transition where institutional stakes are unusually high.
Fung's specific use of the concept emerges from comparative analysis of previous technology transitions (industrialization, electrification, computing). Each transition exhibited the plasticity-consolidation pattern, though on different timescales. The AI transition appears to be exhibiting the pattern on an accelerated timescale, which intensifies both the opportunity and the urgency of institutional innovation during the current window.
Transitions exhibit plasticity-consolidation patterns. Initial experimental periods give way to consolidated arrangements that resist modification for decades or centuries.
The current window is unusually narrow. AI deployment proceeds faster than previous transitions; the plasticity period may close before institutional innovation catches up.
Consolidation creates its own stakeholders. Arrangements acquire interests that depend on their maintenance, making modification progressively more costly.
Robust participatory mechanisms can persist through consolidation. Institutions with their own stakeholders and constituencies can preserve participatory governance even as surrounding arrangements consolidate.