Ronald Coase argued in 1937 that firms exist because market transactions have costs that internalization reduces. Hidalgo offers a different answer: firms exist because productive knowledge is distributed across individuals and resists transfer between them. No individual holds all the knowledge needed to produce a complex product; the knowledge cannot be easily transmitted because it is tacit, contextual, and embedded in specific relationships. The firm is an institutional structure that holds productive knowledge in a form allowing it to be combined, coordinated, and deployed toward producing things no individual could produce alone. This framework predicts how AI will reshape organizations: not by dissolving firms but by changing what the firm contains — externalizing codifiable knowledge to the tool while preserving tacit knowledge inside institutional structure.
The distinction between Coase's transaction-cost firm and Hidalgo's knowledge-container firm determines how one thinks about what AI does to organizations. If the firm is a bundle of internalized transactions, AI should cause firms to shrink as the tool makes it easier to find, coordinate, and monitor external contributors. If the firm is a knowledge container, the analysis differs: AI does not reduce the stickiness of tacit knowledge or eliminate the need for institutional structures coordinating it. AI changes the distribution of knowledge across roles without necessarily changing the institutional structures that coordinate knowledge.
The Trivandrum training illustrates the dynamic with organizational specificity. When engineers began using Claude Code, the org chart did not change — but the flow of contribution did. Designers started writing code. Engineers started building interfaces. The boundaries between specialist roles, which had existed because each role required specific codifiable knowledge that took years to acquire, dissolved when the tool made that knowledge universally accessible. The organizational structure, organized around the distribution of codifiable knowledge, became a vestige — a formal arrangement no longer corresponding to the actual distribution of capability.
But the firm did not dissolve. The people remained. The work still required coordination, still required institutional structures holding tacit knowledge, still required judgment calls about what to build. These decisions did not become easier when codifiable barriers between roles dissolved. If anything, they became harder — because the expanded space of what was possible made the question of what was worth doing more complex and more consequential. The pre-AI knowledge-container firm held two kinds of knowledge: codifiable and tacit. The AI-era firm holds primarily tacit knowledge, because the codifiable layer has been externalized.
This transformation has a strategic implication Edo Segal confronted directly: when five AI-augmented people can do the work of one hundred, why not reduce the team to five? The arithmetic is clean. The board conversation is predictable. Hidalgo's framework reveals what the choice represents. Reducing the team captures the codifiable productivity gain and converts it into margin. Keeping the team preserves the institutional conditions under which tacit knowledge accumulates — the meetings, the disagreements, the long-term relationships through which judgment develops. Margin based on codifiable efficiency is fragile; competitors can replicate it. Capability based on tacit accumulation is durable; it depends on institutional structures competitors cannot purchase.
The knowledge-container theory of the firm developed through Hidalgo's broader program of understanding productive knowledge at the level of economies. Once knowledge was identified as the primary unit of economic analysis and its distribution as the primary determinant of productive capability, the function of the firm had to be reinterpreted accordingly — not as a solution to the transaction-cost problem alone but as an institutional mechanism for aggregating distributed knowledge that resists direct transfer.
Firms aggregate personbytes. The organizational function is to coordinate the distributed productive knowledge that no individual can hold and the market cannot easily transfer.
AI externalizes codifiable aggregation. Tools now provide individuals with codifiable knowledge across domains, reducing the firm's role in that layer.
Tacit aggregation remains internal. Judgment, institutional wisdom, and coordination capacity cannot be externalized to AI and continue to require organizational structure.
The pre-AI firm held both layers. The post-AI firm holds primarily the tacit layer, making it smaller in some dimensions and more complex in others.
Headcount reduction destroys tacit capacity. Firms that interpret productivity gains as a reason to cut headcount dismantle the institutional structures through which tacit knowledge accumulates.
Transaction-cost economists counter that Hidalgo's framework and Coase's are complementary rather than competing — both identify real reasons firms exist. The practical question is which consideration dominates in any given context. For codifiable knowledge work, transaction-cost logic may dominate and AI may indeed shrink firms. For work requiring tacit judgment and institutional coordination, knowledge-container logic dominates and the firm's role persists even as its internal composition changes.