The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (1996) is Chalmers's doctoral dissertation turned into a book that reshaped philosophy of mind. It develops the hard/easy distinction, presents the zombie argument in rigorous form, defends property dualism against the reductive programs dominant in the 1990s, and proposes that consciousness may be a fundamental feature of reality alongside space, time, and mass. The book is the canonical source for the framework this volume applies to AI.
The book's argumentative structure is cumulative. Chapter by chapter, Chalmers builds the case that reductive physicalism cannot adequately account for phenomenal consciousness, that the failure is not merely provisional but structural, and that the right response is not skepticism about consciousness but revision of our metaphysics of the physical.
Three decades later, the book's influence on the AI discourse is hard to overstate. Every serious discussion of machine consciousness either deploys Chalmers's framework or must explicitly reject it. Its vocabulary — hard problem, easy problems, zombies, qualia, phenomenal consciousness — has become the standard vocabulary of the field.
The book grew out of Chalmers's 1993 PhD dissertation at Indiana University, supervised by Douglas Hofstadter. It was published by Oxford University Press in 1996 and has remained in print since.
The hard problem is rigorously defended. Not a passing intuition but a structural feature of reductive explanation.
Zombies are metaphysically possible. If the argument works, physicalism is false.
Property dualism is the right response. One substance, two kinds of property.
Consciousness may be fundamental. Like space, time, mass — not derived from them.