Jonas's extension of Pascal's wager to the technological age: when the bold strategy risks irreversible harm and the cautious strategy risks only deferred benefit, rational self-interest demands priority for the worse outcome regardless of probability.
In the seventeenth century, Pascal argued that rational self-interest demanded belief in God, not because the evidence supported it but because the asymmetry of outcomes — infinite salvation versus infinite damnation — made belief the rational hedge. Jonas saw in Pascal's wager a structure that could be repurposed for the technological age. Not the specific content — he was not arguing about God — but the logical architecture: when stakes are asymmetric, when one outcome is catastrophic and irreversible while the other is merely costly and recoverable, the rational strategy is to prioritize avoidance of the catastrophic outcome regardless of its estimated probability. The wager is not about what is likely. It is about what cannot be undone.
The Asymmetry of the Wager
In The You On AI Field Guide
Applied to AI, the asymmetry takes a specific form. If the optimistic projection proves correct — AI tools genuinely democratize capability, raise the floor of who can