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Dependent Rational Animals
MacIntyre's 1999 book arguing that human rationality is inseparable from embodiment, biological vulnerability, and social dependency — a corrective to his earlier work and a resource for understanding what the machine is not.
Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues is MacIntyre's extension of his earlier virtue ethics in a direction he later acknowledged had been underdeveloped in After Virtue. The book's central thesis is that human beings are rational animals — and the emphasis falls on both words. We are not disembodied reasoners who happen to inhabit bodies. We are animals whose rationality is expressed through, and conditioned by, biological vulnerability, embodied existence, and dependency on other animals of our kind. The virtues are cultivated in and through this embodied, dependent condition. For the AI moment, this means that whatever "intelligence" the machine has, it is not the intelligence of a dependent rational animal — and the attempt to understand AI without attending to this difference inevitably distorts both machine and human.
In The You On AI Field Guide
The book begins with an observation that is simple and consequential: human beings are dependent for substantial portions of their lives on the care
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