The distinction between institutional democracy and democratic practice is Thompson's most radical contribution to political theory. Institutional democracy is the formal apparatus — elections, legislatures, regulatory agencies. Democratic practice is the assertion of the right to self-governance, performed through whatever mechanisms are available when the formal apparatus is closed, captured, or too slow to respond.
The AI transition has produced the specific conditions in which extra-institutional democratic practice becomes necessary. The EU AI Act, the most comprehensive regulatory response, addresses the supply side — what AI companies may build and must disclose — more than the demand side: what protections exist for affected workers and communities. In the United States, regulatory response has been fragmented. The machinery of democratic governance operates on timelines of years and decades. AI operates on timelines of months and quarters. The gap creates the conditions for democratic practice outside institutional channels.
Thompson was unsentimental about the limits. The food riot enforced a just price for a day; the framework knitters' resistance compelled a season of attention. Neither created the durable institutions that later made industrial civilization tolerable. The durable institutions came later, built through decades of sustained organizing after the extra-institutional actions had demonstrated that the institutional deficit was intolerable.
The contemporary resistance performs the same demonstrative function. The lawsuits, strikes, and petitions of AI-affected workers make visible the absence of mechanisms through which the affected participate in governing the transition. The visibility does not create the mechanisms. It creates the political pressure for their creation.
The claim emerges across Thompson's work but is most fully developed in his essays on the eighteenth-century crowd and in The Making of the English Working Class, where the Luddite resistance is treated as political practice rather than criminal disorder.
Institutional democracy vs democratic practice. Formal governance and the assertion of self-governance rights are distinct; the second can occur outside the first.
Closure of channels as precondition. Extra-institutional practice emerges when legitimate channels are closed or captured — not from preference for illegitimate action.
Temporal mismatch in the AI case. Institutional democracy operates too slowly for the AI transition, creating the specific conditions for democratic practice outside institutional channels.
Demonstrative function. Extra-institutional action makes institutional deficits visible, creating pressure for the institutional innovation the deficit requires.