Vetlesen's foundational thesis that moral perception rests not on reason but on susceptibility—the willingness to be touched, moved, made vulnerable—which is exactly what a frictionless, exposure-reducing technology quietly erodes.
The capacity to be affected is the ground on which Arne Johan Vetlesen built his entire account of moral life. Against the modern reflex that treats moral perception as a function of reasoning, Vetlesen argued that the ability to see what matters—to notice suffering, to register that something has gone wrong—depends first on the ability to be touched by what one encounters. Empathy is not a decorative addition to moral reasoning but its precondition; the person who cannot be affected cannot perceive another's suffering as relevant, however sophisticated their cognitive apparatus. This strand of the cycle that begins with [YOU] on AI draws the implication the technology discourse misses: a civilization that has made the elimination of friction into a moral imperative may be reducing, invisibly, the susceptibility on which moral perception itself depends—and a machine that performs care without any vulnerability behind it produces a compassion illusion, not compassion.