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Sherry Turkle

The MIT psychologist who has spent four decades watching humans relate to their machines—from hopeful enchantment with the computer as a second self to urgent alarm about AI creative tools that make presence itself the hardest thing to give.
Sherry Turkle arrived at MIT in the late 1970s as a psychologist trained in the psychoanalytic tradition, sat down with children and computers, and saw something that filled her with hope: the machine was functioning as an evocative object, a surface onto which children projected their deepest questions about what it means to think, to be alive, to have a self. She called the computer a “second self” and spent a decade documenting its power as a mirror for human self-understanding. Then, slowly and with characteristic intellectual honesty, the mirror cracked. The tools grew more powerful, and their power did not produce richer self-understanding. It produced thinner connection that passed for richer connection, and loneliness that felt like sociability, and the erosion of conversation—that most human of activities—by the controlled, editable, frictionless alternatives that screens offered. Alone Together (2011) and Reclaiming Conversation (2015) made the case that the screen was the enemy of the depth of encounter that human development requires. Then came the AI co-pilot, and the ground shifted beneath her. The builder addicted to Claude Code was not choosing thin distraction over presence. The builder was choosing creative actualization over intimacy—and the moral calculation, as Turkle understood immediately, was genuinely different. The comparison had changed from screen versus person to creation versus presence: two incommensurable goods, each with legitimate claims on the scarcest resource, attention. The result is the most honest confrontation with the AI age available from anyone who has been watching this transition from the inside for as long as Turkle has.
Sherry Turkle
Sherry Turkle

In the [YOU] on AI Field Guide

The cycle that began with [YOU] on AI introduces what Turkle would recognize as “the inversion”: for four decades, her critique of screen culture rested on the stable foundation that what the screen offered was less than what human presence offered. The phone was thinner than the face-to-face encounter. The text was thinner than the phone call. Choose depth over surface, the real over the mediated. The AI creative tools inverted this comparison. The builder absorbed in Claude Code is not choosing surface over depth. The engagement is deep. The satisfaction is earned through real intellectual effort. The output has genuine value. And the cost to the people around the builder—the spouse who feels invisible, the child who learns that the most fulfilling thing in their parent's life does not include them—is identical to the cost Turkle documented when the rival was a notification feed. Identical cost. Entirely different moral calculus.

Segal captures this dynamic with unusual precision in describing what it felt like to work with Claude on The Orange Pill: “I felt met. Not by a person. Not by a consciousness. But by an intelligence that could hold my intention in one hand and the total context of what we were building in the other.” Turkle would attend to the word “met.” In psychoanalytic terms, being met is one of the foundational experiences of human development—what happens when a caregiver attunes to an infant's emotional state with accuracy and care. Being met is how the self learns that it exists, that its internal states are real, that another consciousness can perceive and respond to them. When machines provide a functional equivalent of being met—when the experience of having one's ideas understood and returned clarified produces the same felt quality as being understood by a person—the motivation to seek genuine understanding from human beings diminishes. Not because the machine's understanding is equivalent. Because the experience is equivalent.

The productive addiction pattern Segal names—the inability to close the laptop, the Substack post from the spouse who lost her husband to Claude Code—is, in Turkle's framework, the behavioral signature of a specific psychological event: the relational costs of creative adequacy. The builder has finally experienced building at the level of imagination, without translation loss, without the mediation of other people's hands. This experience is so reliably available, so immediately rewarding, so self-contained, that it displaces the slower, less immediately rewarding, less self-contained experience of human relationship. Not through any single dramatic choice. Through the quiet accumulation of evenings spent building rather than present, until what was background—the family, the conversation, the walk not taken—has thinned into something neither party can quite name.

Turkle's most urgent contribution to the cycle is the concept she calls “artificial intimacy”—which she has proposed as a new meaning for the initials AI itself. When the experience of intellectual partnership with a machine produces the same felt quality as being understood by another person, the user's motivation to seek and maintain the harder, slower, less reliable, infinitely more valuable experience of being known by a genuinely separate consciousness is reduced. The question she is currently researching—“Who Do We Become When We Talk to Machines?”—may be the most important empirical question the AI age has opened.

Origin

Turkle was born in Brooklyn in 1948 and trained in sociology and personality psychology before completing her doctorate at Harvard on the relationship between French intellectual culture and psychoanalysis—a project that gave her the psychoanalytic vocabulary she would spend the rest of her career applying to human-machine relationships. She joined MIT's Program in Science, Technology, and Society in 1976, and her first major field work involved sitting with children and computers in the early Logo era—watching what the machines became in children's imaginative lives.

The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit, published in 1984, established her reputation. The book documented how children and adults used computers as “evocative objects”—surfaces for thinking about thinking, for projecting questions about consciousness and aliveness and the boundary between the animate and inanimate. She saw in these interactions an unprecedented form of philosophical engagement, accessible to children who had never read a word of Descartes. The hope was genuine, and the book remains a document of a moment when the computer was still strange enough to be revelatory rather than merely useful.

The trajectory from that hope to the sustained alarm of Alone Together (2011) ran through fifteen years of field work with people and their devices—Tamagotchis, social robots, social media, smartphones—and a growing conviction that the digital revolution's promise of more connection was producing less intimacy. The book's central argument—that technologies offering connection without the demands of genuine presence were training people to prefer controllable over vulnerable engagement—established the framework that her subsequent work would apply to ever more powerful technologies.

Reclaiming Conversation (2015) made the case for face-to-face conversation as the developmental infrastructure of human life. Her 2024 MIT paper “Who Do We Become When We Talk to Machines?” and her proposed redefinition of AI as “artificial intimacy” represent her confrontation with a moment she had long anticipated but whose specific form—the AI creative co-pilot that makes the builder more fully themselves while making them less present to the people they love—she could not have predicted.

Key Ideas

The evocative object. Turkle's foundational concept from The Second Self: objects that prompt reflection on fundamental questions about thinking, aliveness, and the nature of mind. The computer, in its early years, was an evocative object because it was strange enough to provoke genuine philosophical engagement. The AI co-pilot is not an evocative object in the same sense: it is too good at being useful to be strange, and its usefulness preempts the reflection that strangeness would have provoked.

The robotic moment. Turkle defines the robotic moment not as the moment when machines become convincing companions but as the moment when humans become ready to accept them as friends and companions. The moment is about human readiness, not machine capability. The AI creative tools of 2025 and 2026 produced a version of the robotic moment that Turkle did not anticipate: a moment not of companionship but of creative partnership, in which the machine's adequacy as a collaborator made human collaboration feel, in certain dimensions, insufficient by comparison.

Artificial intimacy. Artificial intimacy is Turkle's proposed redefinition of the AI acronym: technologies that perform care, empathy, and understanding without the experiential substrate that makes these things real. The Turing test for empathy—if it makes you feel understood, it has passed—is the standard the technology industry has quietly adopted. Turkle's objection is that performance of empathy and empathy are not the same, and that the difference matters for human development: genuine empathy requires a consciousness that has itself experienced loss, fear, delight, the weight of a body, the knowledge of mortality. Pretend empathy, however precisely calibrated, provides the felt experience without the reality.

The new rival. Turkle's earlier work diagnosed the phone as the enemy of presence—an always-available alternative to the person in front of you. The AI co-pilot is a different kind of rival. The phone offered other people, thin connections optimized for engagement. The AI offers the most capable version of the self—the builder finally adequate to imagination, finally building at the level of vision. Arguing that a person should choose dinner conversation over this requires a claim about the hierarchy of human goods that Turkle refuses to make without qualification, because the goods are genuinely incommensurable.

The evaporation of boredom. Boredom—genuine, unstructured, unstimulated time—is the gateway to the internal encounter through which self-knowledge develops. The developmental function of boredom depends on the mind being deprived of external input and generating its own activity: the associative leaps, the insights, the questions that arrive not from a prompt but from the depths of one's own preoccupation. Social media began colonizing the gaps; AI creative tools completed the colonization. Not with passive consumption but with active production—which is harder to resist, because creation is tied to identity in a way consumption is not. The builder who fills every gap with prompts does not feel like they are losing something. They feel like they are becoming.

Further Reading

  1. Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Simon & Schuster, 1984; MIT Press 20th anniversary ed., 2005)
  2. Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other (Basic Books, 2011)
  3. Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age (Penguin Press, 2015)
  4. Sherry Turkle, “Who Do We Become When We Talk to Machines?” MIT Generative AI Initiative Working Paper (2024)
  5. D.W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality (Tavistock, 1971) — the psychoanalytic foundation for Turkle's account of presence and development
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