The Multiple Drafts Model challenges the implicit assumption behind most AI consciousness discussion: that there is a unified "experiencer" to be replicated. If Dennett is right, the question "does this AI have a subjective stream of consciousness?" may be wrongly formed — because subjective streams are not what consciousness actually is.
The Multiple Drafts Model has found an unexpected home in contemporary AI interpretability research. When researchers probe a language model's internal activations, they often find many parallel, partially-incompatible "candidate" continuations, one of which is selected by the sampling process. The analogy to Dennett's parallel drafts is structural, not merely rhetorical: both cases describe a distributed pattern-producing system whose output is the resolution of a distributed competition rather than the report of a central witness.
Introduced in Dennett's Consciousness Explained (Little, Brown, 1991); elaborated throughout subsequent books.
No Cartesian Theater. No single spot where "it all comes together."
Parallel drafts. Many simultaneous neural processes competing for expression.
Narrative selection. The brain constructs a coherent after-the-fact narrative; phenomenology is partly retrospective.
Report is reconstructive. Dennett argues that introspective reports are after-the-fact constructions, not direct readings of experience. This has substantial empirical support from the "confabulation" literature in cognitive psychology and has direct implications for how we interpret AI systems' self-reports.