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A Treatise on Probability
Keynes's 1921 philosophical masterwork — the argument that probability is a logical relation between evidence and conclusion, not a frequency ratio. The epistemological foundation of Keynesian economics and the most powerful critique of frequency-based AI.
A Treatise on Probability is Keynes's first major work and, in its philosophical depth, perhaps his most rigorous. Written in fragments over a decade and published in 1921, it argues that probability is not a property of events (the frequency with which they occur in repeated trials) but a logical relation between evidence and conclusion (the rational degree of belief that given evidence warrants in a given proposition). The distinction seems technical. It is in fact the epistemological foundation of all of Keynes's subsequent economic work — and the most powerful available critique of the frequency-based architecture underlying contemporary AI.
In The You On AI Field Guide
The frequency interpretation of probability — dominant in statistics, machine learning, and the computational infrastructure of every large language model — holds that probability is the ratio of occurrences in the limit of repeated trials. This interpretation works for repeatable events with stable distributions: dice, cards, insurance