CONCEPT
Simulation vs. Duplication
Searle's sharpest distinction — a computer simulation of a hurricane does not produce rain, a simulation of digestion does not produce nutrients, and a simulation of understanding does not produce comprehension — the argument that formal modeling of a process and actual instantiation of that process are categorically different phenomena.
A computer simulation of a hurricane does not produce rain. A computer simulation of photosynthesis does not produce glucose. A computer simulation of combustion does not produce heat. In each case, the simulation may be perfect — capturing every relevant variable, modeling every interaction with mathematical precision. The simulation is useful; scientists study simulated hurricanes to predict real ones. But the simulation and the thing simulated are different kinds of phenomenon, and no improvement in the simulation's accuracy will cause it to cross the ontological boundary between modeling a process and instantiating it. Searle's claim is that the same distinction applies to minds. A computational simulation of understanding — a system that captures the formal structure of how understanding manifests in behavior — does not constitute understanding, any more than a simulation of a hurricane constitutes a hurricane.
