CONCEPT
Public Goods
Goods that are non-rivalrous (one person's consumption does not diminish another's) and non-excludable (cannot be restricted to contributors) — and therefore systematically under-provided by voluntary action.
Public goods are defined by two structural properties: non-rivalrous consumption (one person's enjoyment does not diminish another's) and non-excludable provision (those who do not contribute cannot be prevented from benefiting). Classic examples include national defense, clean air, basic scientific research, and the rule of law. Because rational individuals cannot be excluded from benefiting whether or not they contribute, the voluntary production of public goods faces the free-rider problem: each person has an incentive to let others bear the cost. Effective AI governance — regulation that prevents concentration of power, protects workers, distributes benefits broadly — is a textbook public good. Its under-provision is structurally predictable.
In The You On AI Field Guide
Paul Samuelson formalized the economic analysis of public goods in 1954, demonstrating that markets will systematically under-provide them even when aggregate willingness to pay exceeds production cost. The reason is that rational individuals will understate their preferences when contributions are voluntary, hoping others will bear the cost. Samuelson's work established the theoretical case for government