CONCEPT
Property Dualism
The metaphysical position that phenomenal properties — the qualia of experience — are distinct from physical properties though they depend on them. Chalmers's preferred framework for reconciling the reality of experience with the reality of physical explanation.
Property dualism holds that there is one kind of substance — physical substance — but two kinds of properties: physical properties and phenomenal properties. The position rejects the Cartesian separation of mind and matter into distinct substances while refusing the reductive move that identifies mental states with physical states. On this view, consciousness arises when physical processes of a certain kind occur, but the phenomenal character of consciousness is not identical to the physical process. It is a distinct property that the process has. Chalmers defends this framework as the most adequate response to the arguments that drive the hard problem.
In The You On AI Field Guide
Property dualism is sometimes called naturalistic dualism to distinguish it from the substance dualism associated with Descartes. It does not posit souls, spirits, or non-physical substances. It posits that physical substance, when organized in certain ways, has properties that cannot be described in purely physical terms. These phenomenal